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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-MAHONEY V. RFE/RLJ 
INC: THE "FOREIGN LAWS" EXCEPTION TO THE ADEA-WHEN A 
CoLLECIlVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT EQUALS A LAW 
INTRODUCIlON 
In recent years, the extent to which American laws should be 
given extraterritorial application has been debated by both Con­
gress and the Supreme Court. Federal agencies have also entered 
this debate by providing opinions as to whether certain laws are 
intended to have effect outside the United States. Often, these fed­
eral institutions disagree over whether to afford extraterritorial ef­
fect. In the 19908, on at least one occasion, conflicting views 
resulted in the congressional overruling of a Supreme Court deci­
sion limiting a statute to territorial effect.1 
In the area of employment discrimination law, this debate has 
resulted in significant changes in the application of United States 
laws overseas. Congress has attempted, as much as possible, to pro­
vide American workers who are employed by American companies 
in foreign countries substantive protections from employment dis­
crimination similar to those afforded to domestic workers. Many 
thousands of Americans work for American companies in foreign 
countries and these employees are particularly interested in the ex­
tent to which United States employment discrimination laws pro­
vide them with protection. Yet, it can be difficult and problematic 
to extend American law beyond our territorial borders. Experience 
tells us that what is legal or customary in one country might be 
illegal in a different country. Potential problems exist when United 
States employment discrimination laws conflict with the laws or 
customs of a foreign nation. 
Congress, in an attempt to limit this possible conflict, fre­
quently includes exclusionary clauses in United States laws so that 
American employers are not required to comply with American law 
when doing so would violate the law of the foreign country of oper­
ation. When such a conflict arises, it is not always clear that the 
foreign law or custom equates with a law as defined in the United 
States. This anomaly presents a problem with no easy solution. 
1. See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
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This Note will analyze the extraterritorial, or foreign, applica­
tion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
("ADEA").2 This Note will discuss the "foreign laws" exception to 
the ADEA through a recent case of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Mahoney v. RPElRL, 
Inc. 3 Specifically, this Note will consider whether an enforceable 
provision in a foreign collective bargaining agreement satisfies the 
requirements for exclusion from coverage of the ADEA. 
Part I of this Note will discuss both the text and the legislative 
history of the ADEA, as well as the important cases that provide 
the basis for understanding the reasoning used in Mahoney. Addi­
tionally, the opinion of the administrative agency charged by Con­
gress with the responsibility for enforcing the ADEA will be 
discussed. Part II will discuss both the lower court and appellate 
court decisions in Mahoney. Finally, in Part III, the Note will at­
tempt to rationalize the prior case law and Mahoney in an effort to 
resolve the issue in this Note. Part III will additionally propose an 
alternative method of resolving the issue in Mahoney. 
I. THE LAW, THE AGENCY, AND THE COURT 
Prior to the enactment of TItle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 ("TItle VII"),4 the laws of the United States provided little or 
no protection for individuals against employment discrimination. 
With the enactment of TItle VII, Congress provided the first sub­
stantive protection to workers from discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.5 Initially, Congress did 
not address discrimination on the basis of age when it enacted TItle 
VII. In 1967, however, Congress passed the ADEA, providing pro­
tection to American workers from age-based job discrimination.6 
2. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 V.S.C. 
§§ 621-634 (1994». 
3. 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as 
amended at 42 V.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994». 
5. See 42 V.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1994). For a more detailed discussion of the 
creation of TItle VII and its provisions, see generally Note, Business Necessity under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 
(1974); Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964, 
84 HARV. L. REv. 1109 (1971); Steven K. Sanborn, Note, Miller v. Maxwell's Interna­
tional, Inc.: Individual Liability for Supervisory Employees Under Title VII and the 
ADEA, 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 143 (1995). 
6. The major substantive provision of the ADEA, found at 29 V.S.c. § 623(a) 
(1994), makes it unlawful for an employer: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi­
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The coverage provisions of the ADEA paralleled TItle VII, but the 
remedial provisions paralleled those of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act ("FLSA").7 
A. Statutory History 
As enacted in 1967, the ADEA included no specific provision 
stating that the Act's scope of coverage applied extraterritorially. 
The prevailing view in the courts was that the ADEA incorporated 
section 13(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which stated that 
"any employee whose services during the workweek are performed 
in a workplace within a foreign country" was not covered by the 
FLSA.8 The result of this view was to limit application of the 
ADEA to the territorial United States. In 1984, to counteract this 
narrow interpretation of the age discrimination statute, Congress 
amended the ADEA to achieve extraterritorial effect.9 
Specifically, Congress amended the definition of an "em­
ployee" to include "any individual who is a citizen of the United 
States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign coun­
try."lO To avoid placing employers in an impossible situation, Con­
gress amended section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA to include an 
avoidance provision for employers when compliance with the 
ADEA would force the employer to violate "the laws of the [for­
eign] country."ll Although the intention to extend ADEA cover­
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, tenns, condi­
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would de­
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other­
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's 
age; or 
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this 
chapter. 
Id. 
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). See Sanborn, supra note 5, at 150-51 & nn.53, 54, 
56, & 61 for a discussion of the relationship between the ADEA and the FLSA. 
8. 29 U.S.C. § 213(f} (1994). The leading case to hold that the ADEA did not 
apply overseas because of the incorporated FLSA provision was C/eQry v. United States 
Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984). For detailed discussions of the extraterritorial 
provisions of the ADEA and other employment statutes, see Derek O. Barella, Note, 
Checking the "Trigger-Happy" Congress: The Extraterritorial Extension of Federal Em­
ployment Laws Requires Prudence, 69 IND. L.J. 889 (1994). 
9. See Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(a)­
(b), 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f}(1) & 630(f} (1994». 
10. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f} (1994). 
11. § 623(f}(1}. Section 623(f}(1} makes it not unlawful for an employer 
to take any action otherwise prohibited under [the ADEA] ... where such 
practices involve an employee in a workplace in a foreign country, and compli­
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age abroad is clearly stated by the 1984 amendment, legislative 
intent in using the phrase "the laws of the country" is lacking. 
However, congressional direction may be found in subsequent 
amendments to other employment laws which created an extraterri­
torial effect. 
In 1991, the Supreme Court held that Title VII did not apply 
extraterritorially, in spite of the argument to the contrary by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),12the 
agency charged with enforcement of the ADEA. In the case ,of 
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,13 in holding for the respon­
dent-employer, the Supreme Court applied for the first time a 
"clear-statement rule" regarding extraterritorial application of any 
laws of the United States.14 This rule required Congress to clearly 
state an intention to provide extraterritorial effect in order to over­
come a strong presumption against extraterritorial application of 
United States law.iS 
ance with [the ADEA] ... would cause such employer ... to violate the laws 
of the country in which such workplace is located. 
Id. 
12. See infra Part I.B.l for a discussion of the EEOC's authority and Part I.B.3 
for the standard of deference accorded to the EEOC regarding its interpretive 
guidelines. 
13. 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
14. See id. at 248. In his dissent in Arabian American, Iustice Marshall empha­
sized the significance of the Court's new policy. "The majority converts the presump- . 
tion against extraterritoriality into a clear-statement rule ...." Id. at 263 (Marshall, I., 
dissenting). Iustice Marshall argued that the majority had extended the mere presump­
tion, which could be overcome by implicit legislative intention, to the clear-statement 
rule, which is irrebuttable without explicit congressional wording to the contrary. See 
id. at 261-66 (Marshall, I., dissenting). Iustice Marshall argued that the proper standard 
was the weaker presumption standard, which would have accommodated his view that 
TItle VII applied extraterritorially. See id. at 266-71 (Marshall, I., dissenting). 
For discussions on the difference between presumptions and clear-statement rules, 
see McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,21-22 
(1963) (extraterritorial effect not given to National Labor Relations Act; clear congres­
sional statement was needed because extraterritoriality of the statute would violate in­
ternationallawand State Department regulations); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 
S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) ("the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly ex­
pressed" was necessary before extraterritorial effect given to a statute involving a very 
"delicate field of international relations"); and Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 
285 (1949) (the presumption against extraterritoriality derives from "[t]he canon of con­
struction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is 
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States"). 
15. See Arabian Am., 499 U.S. at 248. In a strong dissent, Iustice Marshall ar­
gued that enough evidence existed in the legislative history to establish legislative intent 
to extend TItle VII protection to Americans overseas. See id. at 266-75 (Marshall, I., 
dissenting). Justice Marshall also emphasized the EEOC's broad interpretation of TItle 
VII's coverage, as well as the "long-standing interpretation of the Department of Jus­
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When Arabian American was decided, Congress was in the 
process of amending TItle VII. In order to overturn the Supreme 
Court's holding in Arabian American, Congress chose to include in 
the Civil Rights Act of 199116 a grant of extraterritorial effect to 
TItle VII,17 
In order to satisfy the Supreme Court's "clear-statement rule," 
Congress explicitly included in the amended TItle VII definition of 
employee: "With respect to employment in a foreign country, such 
term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States."18 
Furthermore, Congress included in the 1991 amendments an exclu­
sion provision almost identical to section 623(f)(1), which allowed 
employers to avoid TItle VII if doing so would require the employer 
to violate foreign law,19 
Although the intent to extend coverage of TItle VII was ex­
pressed clearly in the amendment and the accompanying legislative 
history, far less clear was the scope of the provision providing em­
ployers with a foreign law defense. Congress gave no direct clues as 
to how to interpret the word "law" in the amendment. Since there 
was no legislative guidance on the meaning of the "law" of the for­
tice, the agency with secondary enforcement responsibility under TItle VII," which "re­
inforced" the EEOC's position. [d. at 276 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Interestingly, 
Justice Marshall quoted former Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia, who in a 
1975 speech to the Senate Subcommittee on International Finance stated that TItle VII 
implicitly applied "to the employment of United States citizens by covered employers 
anywhere in the world." [d. at 277-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his concurring opin­
ion in Arabian American, however, Justice Scalia argued that the EEOC's interpreta­
tion was not reasonable in light of the newly created "clear-statement rule" because 
"mere implications from the statutory language" could not satisfy the congressional 
burden. [d. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
16. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. (1994». 
17. See Martin Adler, Note, Nailing Down the Coffin Lid: The Rise and Fall ofthe 
After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine in Title VII Litigation, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 719, 
734 (1994) ("The [Civil Rights Act of 1991] legislatively overruled [the Arabian Ameri­
can] decision . . . . "). 
18. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 100(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994». 
19. The amendment states: 
It shall not be unlawful under [TItle VII] for an employer ... to take any 
action otherwise prohibited by [TItle VII], with respect to an employee in a 
workplace in a foreign country ifcompliance with [TItle VII] would cause such 
employer . .. to violate the law ofthe foreign country in which such workplace 
is located. 
[d., § 109(b), 105 Stat. at 1077 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(b» (empha­
sis added). 
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eign country within Title VII, one can draw no inference as to the 
meaning of the "laws" within the ADEA. 
B. Agency Guidance on What Constitutes a "Law" 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the pri­
mary federal agency charged with the duty of enforcing United 
States employment discrimination laws, including the ADEA.20 
Since the phrase "laws of the country" in section 623(f)(1) of the 
ADEA is not facially clear and Congress provided no explicit defi­
nition for the phrase, the EEOC's definition of the phrase is poten­
tially helpful and relevant. Initially, this section will detail the role 
of the EEOC in interpreting the ADEA. Next, the EEOC's defini­
tion of "the laws of the country" will be discussed. To determine 
the importance of the EEOC's definition of section 623(f)(1), this 
section will conclude by discussing the extent to which EEOC opin­
ions should be recognized and enforced by the courts. 
1. The Role of the EEOC under the ADEA 
When Congress originally enacted ntle VII in 1964, it created 
the EEOC.21 The statutory text of Title VII indicates that Congress 
intended the EEOC to help admjnister22 and enforce the statute's 
mandates.23 Congress did not, however, provide the EEOC with 
broad enforcement abilities. Section 706, entitled "Enforcement 
Provisions," gives the EEOC the power to investigate charges of 
violations of Title VII.24 The EEOC must first notify the employer 
against whom the charge is made of such charge.2S Thereafter, if 
the EEOC concludes after investigating "that there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall en­
deavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice 
by informal methods of conference, conciliation, [and/or] 
persuasion."26 
Congress did not provide the EEOC with the legislative au­
20. See infra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of the role of the EEOC under TItle VII 
and the ADEA. 
21. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705,78 Stat. 241, 258 (codi­
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4). 
22. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4) (providing the make-up, 
powers, and obligations of the Commission). 
23. See id. § 706, 78 Stat. at 259 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5) 
(providing the enforcement mechanism of the Commission). 
24. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b». 
25. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2OOOe-5(b». 
26. Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b». 
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thority to promulgate regulations, which carry the force of law. In­
stead, Congress implicitly authorized the EEOC to create 
interpretive guidelines by allowing an employer to avoid TItle VII 
liability if the employer relied in good faith on "any written inter­
pretation or opinion of the [EEOC].''27 Under a guideline, an ad­
ministrative agency provides its view of the meaning of a statutory 
provision.28 
When Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967, it included sub­
stantially the same grant of authority to the EEOC as it granted 
under TItle VII.29 The EEOC was, however, authorized to make 
independent investigations for possible ADEA violations, in con­
trast to the TItle VII requirement of the existence of a charge.30 
Similar to TItle VII, the EEOC has implicit authority to promulgate 
interpretive guidelines of the ADEA. Section 626( e) of the ADEA 
incorporates a provision of the Portal-to-Portal Act,31 which pro­
vides an employer with a defense based upon a good faith "reliance 
on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or 
interpretation of the [enforcing] agency."32 
2. EEOC's Interpretation of Section 623(f)(1) 
On March 3, 1989, the EEOC made its first official statement 
on the extraterritorial application of the ADEA by issuing policy 
guidelines.33 In the publication, which was signed by EEOC Chair­
27. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 713(b), 78 Stat. at 265 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-12(b». 
28. For a discussion of the difference between regulations, called "legislative 
rules," which carry the force" of law, and "interpretive rules," which explain how an 
agency will construe and enforce a statute, see 2 K.c. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 
TREATISE 36 (2d ed. 1978). 
29. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 
§ 7(a)-(e), 81 Stat. 602, 604-05 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(a)-(e) (1994». 
Although, as previously stated, the remedial provisions in the ADEA were based not 
on Title VII, but instead on the Fair Labor Standards Act, see supra text accompanying 
note 7, see also Sanborn, supra note 5, at 150-51 & nn.53, 54, 56, & 61, the provisions 
providing for the filing of a charge with the agency, agency notice, and subsequent at­
tempted agency reconciliation are functionally the same. See Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 7(a)-(e), 81 Stat. at 604-05 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 626(a)-(e». 
30. See § 7(a), 81 Stat. at 604 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(a». 
31. See § 7(e), 81 Stat. at 605 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e» (incor­
porating § 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84, 89 (current version 
at 29 U.S.C. § 259». 
32. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. at 89 (current version at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 259). 
33. See Policy Guidance: Application of Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967 (ADEA) and the Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963 to American Firms Overseas, 
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man Clarence Thomas, the EEOC acknowledged the potential for 
conflicts of laws due to the overseas coverage of the ADEA with­
out discussing what the Commission considered a valid defense 
under section 623(f)(1).34 Later in 1989, however, the EEOC is­
sued a second set of guidelines that considered in detail the ques­
tion that had been overlooked in the original release.35 
Initially, the policy guidelines acknowledged the lack of direc­
tion from Congress on what constitutes a "law," stating: "[t]he 
ADEA, as well as the legislative history interpreting the Act, is si­
lent as to what constitutes a 'law' for purposes of setting forth a 
[section 623(f)(1)] defense."36 The EEOC's second release on sec­
tion 623(f)(1) provided five hypothetical examples intended to aid 
in construing the "foreign laws" exception. The second, third, and 
fourth examples provided guidance on what the EEOC considered 
the word "law" to mean in the statute. The first and fifth examples 
concerned other issues relating to the statutory provision.37 
The second example involved company created provisions. For 
the sake of clarity, the EEOC prefaced the example by stating that 
"[a] 'law,' however, clearly does not include a corporationlbusi­
ness's rules, regulations or policies of employment."38 The example 
read as follows: 
Example 2 - CP is a 64-year-old United States citizen working 
in the country of Xenon for R, a United States business concern. 
At the annual stockholders meeting, an amendment to the corpo­
rate charter is adopted whereby the corporation must reduce any 
employee's salary by 25% upon their reaching the age of 65. The 
Xenon Civil Code provides that all corporate charters and 
amendments to corporate charters must be registered with the 
Department of Commerce. 1\vo weeks later R notifies CP of its 
intent to reduce CP's salary upon CP's reaching the age of 65. 
Their Overseas Subsidiaries, and Foreign Firms, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 'I 2165 
(Mar. 3, 1989). 
34. See id. at 2308-09. 
35. See Policy Guidance: Analysis of the Sec. 4(f)(l) "foreign laws" Defense of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of1967,2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 'I 6524 
(Dec. 5, 1989). 
36. Id. at 5121. 
37. Example 1 indicated that domestic coverage of the ADEA included all 50 
states, the District of Columbia, and all United States territories and possessions. In all 
of the listed places, the "foreign laws" defense was inapplicable. See id. Example 5 
indicated that in order to invoke the "foreign laws" defense, an employer must be 
forced to violate the law of the specific country in which the employee works, not a 
separate country with which the employer has contact. See id. at 5124. 
38. Id. at 5121. 
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CP then files a charge of age discrimination with the Commis­
sion. In response to CP's charge, R asserts a sec. [623(f)(l») "for­
eign laws" defense as CP's continued employment at a non­
reduced wage would violate its government registered company 
charter. 
R's defense would fail in this instance as the provisions of 
R's government registered company charter do not rise to the 
. level of a foreign law under sec. [623(f)(l»).39 
This example indicated that section 623(f)(1) only protected em­
ployers who would be forced to violate a law imposed by the gov­
ernment. A self-imposed obligation, even one that received foreign 
government recognition, would not provide an employer with a 
defense. 
The next relevant example involved the issue of the timing of 
the enactment of foreign legislation that would create an otherwise 
valid defense to the ADEA. 
Example 3 - Assume for purposes of this example that the Re­
public of Argon's Constitution provides that only a bill which 
passes both houses of the legislature shall have the force and ef­
fect of law within the boundaries of the country. Due to over­
whelming public support by voters in Argon a measure is 
introduced and passed in the lower house of government that re­
quires an employer to retire employees at the age of 55. CP is a 
57-year-old United States citizen working in Argon for R, an 
American corporation. R notifies CP of its decision to retire CP 
immediately~ CP then files a charge of age discrimination with 
the Commission. 1\vo weeks later the upper house of govern­
ment passes the mandatory retirement bill. R responds to CP's 
charge by asserting a sec. [623(f}(l») "foreign laws" defense 
grounded in the recently adopted mandatory retirement law. 
A sec. [623(f)(l)] defense would not be available to R under 
these circumstances as no mandatory retirement law existed at 
the time of R's decision to terminate CP, i.e., only one house had 
approved the measure. Of course, since the bill later became 
law, it could well have a limiting effect on the available relief, 
e.g., reinstatement would not be feasible.40 
This example highlighted the requirement by the EEOC that a 
"foreign law" be fully in force before an employer can seek protec­
tion under the defense provision. Additionally, this example im­
plicitly prohibited employers from relying on any foreign 
39. [d. at 5121-23. 
40. [d. at 5122. 
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. government enactment that did not achieve "the force and effect of 
law." 
The last relevant example stressed a direct causation require­
ment before an employer could receive the protection of the "for­
eign laws" defense. 
Example 4 - Assume for purposes of this example that a Tho­
rium law requires employers to pay an annual fee of $50 for 
every active employee age 65 or above. This fee is used to fund 
Thorium's program to provide workers' compensation benefits. 
While the program is available to all employees in the country, 
Thorium has determined that the greater frequency and amount 
of benefits paid to persons 65 and older justifies the assessment. 
R, a United States employer operating in Thorium, employs 50 
U.S. citizens, 10 of whom are 65 or above. On the last pay period 
of the year, in addition to normal deductions, R subtracts $50 
from the paycheck of each person 65 or above. In responding to 
charges of age discrimination filed by the 10 older workers, R 
asserts that compliance with the ADEA (not deducting addi­
tional money from the wages of older workers) would cause it to 
violate a law of Thorium. 
R's foreign law defense would fail in this hypothetical situa­
tion because treating employees of all ages equally with respect 
to their compensation as required by the ADEA would not 
"cause" a violation of Thorium law. The law in question does not 
require that individual employees 65 and above be assessed the 
fee. Indeed, the Thorium law is entirely silent with respect to the 
source of the levy. R had the option of paying the $500 itself or 
pro rating the amount deducted among all of its employees. 
Since either course of action would have satisfied the require­
ments of the ADEA without causing R to violate Thorium law, 
R's sec. [623(f)(1)] defense would fail.41 
In effect, this example prevented employers from arguing that the 
excessive cost, difficulty, or burden of complying with a foreign law 
would require the employer to violate that law. 
Read together, the examples from the guidelines indicated an 
EEOC intention that the "foreign laws" exception should be con­
strued narrOWly. Example 2 indicated that the "law" which causes a 
conflict must come directly from the foreign government, rather 
than from the employer. The exclusionary provision should not 
protect an employer whose own actions created the conflict. Exam­
ple 3 indicated that employers should only rely on fully and prop­
41. Id. at 5123 (emphasis added). 
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erly enacted laws. Employer reliance on anything less than an 
enacted provision would be improper. Finally, Example 4 indicated 
that an employer could not avoid complying with the ADEA be­
cause a foreign law made compliance difficult or inconvenient. The 
EEOC therefore required that it be impossible to simultaneously 
comply with the ADEA and the foreign law. 
3. Standard of Deference Owed to the EEOC 
Since the EEOC had published an interpretation of section 
623(f)(1) of the ADEA, the important question is what effect that 
opinion deserves. Initially, the limited legislative authority of the 
EEOC affects this question.42 Since the EEOC cannot promulgate 
regulations with the force of law, courts and writers alike claim that 
the EEOC should not receive the highest level of judicial defer­
ence.43 1\vo landmark decisions regarding administrative agency 
deference provide separate rules of law to debate. 
The first case, Skidmore v. Swift & Co. ,44 provided direction to 
courts faced with interpretive guidelines. The Supreme Court held 
that "rulings, interpretations and opinions of [an agency] ..., while 
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do con­
stitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance. "45 The Court then 
created a four factor test which courts should use to determine 
"[t]he weight of such [interpretive guidelines] in a particular case": 
(1) "the thoroughness evident in its consideration," (2) "the validity 
of its reasoning," (3) "its consistency with earlier and later pro­
nouncements," and (4) "all those factors which give it power to per­
suade, if lacking power to control."46 
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 47 In Chevron, the Court 
adopted a new two-part test to determine whether to afford defer­
ence to an administrative agency rule with the force of law.48 First, 
42. For a discussion of the authority of the EEOC and its ability to issue guide­
lines, see supra notes 21-32. 
43. See generally John S. Moot, Comment, An Analysis of Judicial Deference to 
EEOC Interpretative Guidelines, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 213 (1987); Jamie A. Yavelberg, Note, 
The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift· Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations After 
EEOC v. ARAMCO, 42 DUKE L.J. 166 (1992). 
44. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
45. Id. at 140. 
46. Id. Hereinafter, this test will be referred to as the Skidmore test. 
47. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
48. See id. Hereinafter, this test will be referred to as the Chevron test. See also 
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a court must look to a statute to determine if it is clear and unam­
biguous.49 If so, the court then applies this clear meaning without 
concerning itself with an agency's view.50 If the statute is ambigu­
ous, then the court, in step two, defers to any agency rule so long as 
it is reasonable.51 The effect of the second step is to prevent a court 
from "substitut[ing] its own construction of a statutory provision for 
a reasonable interpretation made by" an agency.52 In the case of 
EEOC guidelines, the issue is whether the Chevron test supplants 
the Skidmore test even though Chevron referred to rules with full 
legislative effect.53 
In attempting to determine the proper deference that should 
be given to EEOC guidelines, two recent Supreme Court cases fo­
cus on the issue, without giving any precise answers. In 1988, the 
Supreme Court decided EEOC v. Commercial Office Products 
Co. ,54 in which the Court analyzed an EEOC interpretation of Title 
VII. In finding that deference was appropriate in that case, the 
Court applied a standard in agreement with the Chevron test. The 
Court stated that "it is axiomatic that the EEOC's interpretation of 
Title VII, for which it has primary enforcement responsibility, need 
not be the best one by grammatical or any other standards."55 
Rather, the Court stated, "the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous 
language need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference. "56 
This approach was consistent with several previous Supreme Court 
decisions on deference to EEOC guidelines.57 
Three years later, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of 
the extraterritorial effect of Title VII in EEOC v. Arabian Ameri-
Yavelberg, supra note 43, at 173-75 for a further discussion of Chevron and its affect on 
Skidmore. 
49. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
50. See id. 
51. Id. at 844-45. 
52. Id. at 844. 
53. Prior to Chevron, the Supreme Court treated EEOC guidelines inconsis­
tently. Compare Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) and Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,434 (1971) (EEOC's interpretive guidelines "entitled 
to great deference") with General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) 
(using the Skidmore test to conclude the Court would not defer to a particular EEOC 
guideline). If Chevron does supplant Skidmore, any reasonable EEOC interpretation 
of an 'ambiguous statute would receive deference. 
54. 486 U.S. 107 (1988). 
55. Id. at 115. 
56. Id. 
57. See supra note 53 for examples of earlier cases granting the EEOC deference. 
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can Oil Co. 58 The majority of the Court ignored the holding of 
Commercial Office Products and instead cited to a 1976 case, Gen­
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert,59 that did not use the "great deference" 
standard.6o Applying Gilbert, the Court stated that the proper stan­
dard of deference to EEOC guidelines was the Skidmore test61 and 
the EEOC's interpretation "[did] not fare well under [the Skidmore 
test]."62 Earlier in its opinion, however, the Court had held that 
TItle VII did not express a clear legislative intention to create extra­
territorial effect.63 Since the "clear-statement rule"64 was not satis­
fied, the proper degree of deference to be afforded to the EEOC 
was not central to the Court's holding. 
In concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that the Chevron reason­
ableness test was the appropriate standard for· evaluating EEOC 
guidelines, but that the EEOC's interpretation of TItle VII as ap­
plying overseas was unreasonable in light of the "clear-statement 
rule" against extraterritorial application of American laws.65 Jus­
tice Scalia argued that Commercial Office Products rather than Gil
bert was the correct pronouncement on deference to the EEOC's 
interpretive guidelines.66 Justice Scalia explained that the approach 
in Gilbert of affording limited deference to EEOC guidelines re­
sulted from a dated view that a distinction should be made between 
rules with and without the force of law.67 In dissent, Justice Mar­
shall agreed that the proper deference standard was to be found in 
Commercial Office Products, but disagreed with both the majority 
and concurrence that the EEOC's position was unreasonable.68 
C. 	 United States Supreme Court Guidance on What Constitutes a 
"Law" 
In addition to agency interpretation of the meaning of "foreign 
laws" in the ADEA, another source for construing the phrase is 
58. 499 U.S. 244 (1991). See supra notes 13-17 for a discussion of Arabian 
American. 
59. 	 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
60. 	 See Arabian Am. , 499 U.S. at 256-57. 
61. 	 See supra note 46 and accompanying text for the Skidmore factors. 
62. 	 Arabian Am., 499 U.S. at 257. 
63. 	 See id. at 248-53. 
64. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the c1ear­
statement rule. 
65. 	 See Arabian Am. , 499 U.S. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
66. 	 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
67. 	 See id. at 259-60 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
68. 	 See id. at 274-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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existing decisional law. This section will discuss two Supreme Court 
cases that have interpreted similarly written statutory provisions 
contained in statutes other than the ADEA. 
1. 	 Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. American Train 
Dispatchers' Ass'n69 
In Norfolk & Western, the Supreme Court agreed to hear two 
consolidated cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit that had similar factual and procedural 
histories, and a common legal question.7o At issue in Norfolk & 
Western was a clause in the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA"),71 
section 11341(a), that exempted a rail carrier from "the antitrust 
laws and from all other law, includiilg State and municipallaw."72 
69. 	 499 U.S. 117 (1991). 
70. The two cases were collectively called Brotherhood ofRy. Carmen v. ICC, 880 
F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The first case, Norfolk S. Corp.- Control-Norfolk & W. 
Ry. Co. and S. Ry. Co., 366 I.C.C. 173 (1982), involved the acquisition by NWS Enter­
prises, Inc. of the Norfolk and Western Railway Company and the Southern Railway 
Company. The Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"), pursuant to its authority, 
initially approved the railroad acquisitions. Subsequently, a dispute arose regarding the 
applicability of a collective bargaining agreement that covered Norfolk and Western 
employees. Mandatory arbitration was triggered, resulting in a ruling adverse to the 
employees. The affected employees' union, the American 'frain Dispatchers' Associa­
tion, appealed to the ICC, challenging the arbitration ruling. See Norfolk & Western, 
499 U.S. at 121-23. 
The second case, CSX Corp.-Control-Chessie Sys., Inc. and Seaboard Coast Line 
Indus., Inc., 363 I.C.C. 521 (1980), involved the acquisition by CSX Corp. of Chessie 
System, Inc. and Seaboard Coast Line Industries, Inc. As in the NWS Enterprises ac­
quisition, the ICC granted approval to the acquisition, a dispute arose on a collective 
bargaining agreement, and arbitration returned a ruling against the employees, who 
worked for Seaboard Coastline Industries in this case. The employees' union, the 
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, appealed unsuccessfully to the ICC. See Norfolk & 
Western, 499 U.S. at 123-25. 
Both unions appealed the adverse ICC rulings. Hearing the cases together, the 
court of appeals reversed both ICC rulings, finding for the petitioner unions. Thereaf­
ter, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari of the affected rail­
roads, who were the respondents in the consolidated cases at the court of appeals level. 
See id. at 125-26. 
71. 	 49 U.S.C. §§ 11301-11367 (1994). 
72. § 11341(a). Section 11341(a) can only be applied after the ICC has approved 
a merger between transportation carriers pursuant to § 11343(a)(1). The ICC has ex­
clusive authority to approve § 11343(a)(1) mergers. According to the Court, the 
merger provisions of the ICA "were designed to promote 'economy and efficiency in 
interstate transportation by the removal of the burdens of excessive expenditure.'" 
Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 132 (quoting Thxas v. United States, 292 U.S. 522, 534­
35 (1934». The Court further indicated that § 11341(a) was necessary to facilitate a 
pre-approved merger. Without § 11341(a)'s avoidance provisions, these mergers would 
be "difficult, if not impossible, to achieve." Id. at 133. Section 11341(a) is, however, 
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Writing for the majority,73 Justice Kennedy held that this clause in 
the ICA "includes any obstacle imposed by law," both "the sub­
stantive and remedial laws respecting enforcement of collective­
bargaining agreements. "74 
In reaching its decision, the majority used the statutory analysis 
formula of Chevron,15 looking first to the plain language of the stat­
ute. The majority found that section 11341(a)'s exemption from 
"the antitrust laws and all other law, including State and municipal 
law" was "clear, broad, and unqualified," and thus facially ex­
pressed the legislative intent of Congress.76 "By itself, the phrase 
'all other law' indicates no limitation" and "is broad enough to in­
clude laws that govern the obligations imposed by contract. "77 The 
majority reasoned that the laws that enforce contractual obligations 
are incorporated into a contract, and here, the ICA provision "sus­
pend[s] application of the law that makes the contract binding."78 
The majority also noted that its interpretation was consistent with 
that of the ICC, though it was reached without affording the agency 
any deference.79 
Justice Stevens argued in dissentSO that section 11341(a) was 
not clear on its face and that the legislative history of the ICA, con­
trary to the majority's holding, indicated no intention to have the 
"all other laws" provision apply to private contractual obligations, 
such as the collective bargaining agreements at issue.81 Justice Ste­
vens also argued that due to the historical "respect that our legal 
system has always paid to the enforceability of private contracts-a 
respect that is evidenced by express language in the Constitution 
itself-there should be a powerful presumption against finding an 
implied authority to impair contracts" in a statute such as the 
constrained by a qualifying condition, which pennits the exemption from all other law 
only to the extent necessary to effect the merger. 
73. Joining Justice Kennedy were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, 
Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter. 
74. Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 133. 
75. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Chevron 
test. 
76. Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 128. 
77. [d. at 129. 
78. [d. at 130. 
79. See iii. at 133-34. The majority could not afford the ICC any deference once it 
concluded that the statute was clear on its face because Chevron requires the Court to 
apply the clear interpretation of the statute. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the Chevron test. 
SO. Justice Marshall joined in the dissent. 
81. Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 134-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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ICA.82 Further, the dissent posed a question that the majority 
never addressed: Would not Congress write into the text of a statute 
the intention to supersede private contracts if it so intended?83 
2. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens84 
In Wolens, the Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether a class action breach of contract claim against American 
Airlines survived a preemption provision included in the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978 ("ADA").85 The pertinent provision 
within the ADA, section 1305(a)(1), stated that "no State ... shall 
enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provi­
sion having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or 
services of any air carrier ...."86 Specifically, the Court had to 
determine whether the phrase "any law" within the statute was 
broad enough to encompass state common law which enforced 
contracts. 
In deciding Wolens, the Court faced an issue similar to that 
found in Norfolk & Western, where the Court had to determine if 
the phrase "all other law" in the ICA included collective bargaining 
agreements, a specific type of contract.87 In Wolens, if the phrase 
"any law" included private contracts, then section 1305(a)(1) would 
preempt plaintiffs' allegations and a result similar to that in Norfolk 
& Western would be reached. H the phrase did not include private 
contracts, then the plaintiffs' common law contract claims would re­
main unaffected by the preemption provision. 
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court,88 and con­
cluded that section 1305(a)(1) did not preempt plaintiffs' contract 
82. Id. at 139 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
83. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
84. 115 S. a. 817 (1995). 
85. Pub. L. No. 95-504,92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (amending scattered sections of 49 
U.S.C.). In Wolens, the Court also addressed the issue of whether the ADA preempted 
a state consumer protection statute. Wolens, 115 S. a. at 823. The majority held that 
state statutory enactments fell within the scope of the ADA provision and were pre­
empted. See id. at 823-24. 
86. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988) (repealed 1994) (current version at 49 
U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994). The new prOvision replaces "relating to rates, routes, and 
services" with "related to a price, route, or service." 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). 
ff7. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of Norfolk & 
Western. 
88. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined in 
the majority opinion. Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's finding that the 
breach of contract claims survived preemption, but dissented on a separate issue in the 
case. See Wolens, 115 S. a. at 827 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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claims. The majority held that no preemption resulted because the 
enforcement of private, "self-imposed undertakings . . . d[id] not 
amount to a 'State's enact[ment] or enforce[ment of] any law, rule, 
regulation, standard, or other provision having the force or effect of 
law' within the meaning of [section] 1305(a)(l)."89 The majority, 
though somewhat unclear in its reasoning process, gave several ex­
planations for its holding.90 The language of the statute, according 
to the majority, helped it reach its conclusion. 
[T]he word series "law, rule,regulation, standard, or other provi­
sion ... connotes official, government-imposed policies, not the 
terms of a private contract." Similarly, the phrase "having the 
force and effect of law" is most naturally read to "refe[r] to bind­
ing standards of conduct that operate irrespective of any private 
agreement."91 
Additionally, the majority looked to the broad purpose of the 
ADA for guidance, which the Supreme Court had previously said 
was "to promote 'maximum reliance on competitive market 
forces."'92 In finding this broad purpose better supported by find­
ing section 1305(a)(l) to not impair contracts, the majority ac­
knowledged the proposition that" '[t]he stability and efficiency of 
the market depend fundamentally on the enforcement of [private] 
89. Woiens, 115 S. Ct. at 824 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Cu­
riae at 9). 
90. It is not apparent from the opinion whether the majority found § 1305(a)(1) 
facially clear, as did the majority in Norfolk & Western, or whether the majority found 
the text of § 1305(a)(1) ambiguous, and looked to the statute as a whole, the legislative 
history, and the interpretation of the relevant administrative agency. Additionally, if 
the latter course was used, the extent to which the majority credited the agency inter­
pretation is uncertain. Unlike the Norfolk & Western Court, which immediately cited 
to Chevron as a guide for the process of interpreting statutory text, see Norfolk & West­
ern Ry. Co. v. American nain Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 128 (1991), the Wolens 
majority gave no indication that it was following precedent or an interpretive plan. 
91. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824 n.5 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Cu­
riae at 16). In the same footnote, the Court also acknowledged that the use of the word 
"enforce" could "perhaps be read to preempt even state-court enforcement of private 
contracts." [d. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 17). In acknowl­
edging this possible interpretation, the majority fostered the confusion over how it 
reached its conclusion, as the statement implied that the statute was ambiguous. With­
out the statement, the most likely conclusion would have been that the majority found 
the statute to be clear on its face. If the majority did believe the statute was ambiguous, 
it should have simply deferred to the Department of nansportation's interpretation, 
which was the same as the majority's, as reasonable and controlling under Chevron. 
For a discussion of the Chevron test for statutory construction, see supra notes 47-52 
and accompanying text. 
92. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824 (quoting Morales v. nans World Airlines, Inc., 504 
U.S. 374, 378 (1992». 
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agreements freely made, based on needs perceived by the con­
tracting parties at the time."'93 Finally, Justice Ginsburg noted that 
the statutory and regulatory schemes regarding air transportation, 
when viewed generally, supported the majority's conclusion.94 
In a footnote, the majority defended its seemingly conflicting 
decision in Norfolk & Western,95 which the defendant had argued as 
support for its interpretation of section 1305(a)(1) of the ADA. 
"We read the exemption clause to empower the ICC to override, 
individually, a carrier's obligations under a collective-bargaining 
agreement. Our reading accorded with the ICC's and 'ma[ de] sense 
of the consolidation provisions."'96 The majority further noted that 
without ICC preemption of collective bargaining agreements, "'rail 
carrier consolidations would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
achieve. '''97 
Thereafter, relying on its explanation for the Court's decision 
in Norfolk & Western, the majority argued that the two cases were 
consistent because both made sense in the context of the statutory 
scheme being interpreted. The Court stated "[ s ]imilarly in this 
case, our reading of the statutory formulation accords with that of 
the superintending agency, here, the DOT, and is necessary to 
make sense of the statute as a whole. "98 
In dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that state contract claims 
should be preempted by the ADA.99 Justice O'Connor argued that 
the interpretation relied on in Norfolk & Western should apply to 
section 1305(a)(1) of the ADA.100 The dissent stressed the require­
ment that contractual obligations can only be enforced by state con­
tract law, common or statutory, which should be preempted by the 
ADA under the broad reading of "law" used in Norfolk & 
Western. lOl 
93. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 23). 
94. See id. at 825-26. 
95. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text for a description of the Norfolk 
& Western case. 
%. Wolens, 115 S. Q. at 824 n.6 (citing Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. American 
1i"ain Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 132 (1991». 
97. Id. (quoting Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 133). 
98. Id. 
99. See id. at 828-29 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis­
senting in part). Justice O'Connor, joined in part by Justice Thomas, concurred in the 
Court's holding that the state statutory claims were preempted. See id. 
100. See id. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent­
ing in part). See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ADA. 
101. See ill. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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Norfolk & Western and Wolens gave the Supreme Court the 
opportunity to decide two similar cases involving disputes over the 
applicability of contractual agreements in light of potentially con­
flicting statutory provisions. The Court reached opposite results in 
these cases, although no single reason can be offered to explain the 
differing outcomes. Nevertheless, the reasoning used by the 
Supreme Court in each case is relevant and important in attempting 
to reach an understanding of the similar statutory provision in the 
ADEA, section 623(f)(1). 
II. MAHONEY V. RFElRL, INC 102 
In this section, the Mahoney case will be discussed in depth. 
The first part will describe the facts of the case, including the early 
procedural history. Next, the opinion of the United States District 
Court for the District of ColumbialO3 will be discussed. The section 
will conclude with a discussion of the unanimous decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.104 
A. Statement of Facts 
The defendant in Mahoney, RFEIRL, is best known for the 
broadcast services it provides, Radio Free Europe and Radio Lib­
erty.10S A non-profit corporation operating under Delaware laws, 
RFEIRL's principal place of business is Munich, Germany, where it 
employs some 300 American workers.106 
In 1982, the defendant and the defendant's employees entered 
into a collective bargaining agreement that required the mandatory 
retirement of most employees at age sixty-five.107 The collective 
bargaining agreement was to continue indefinitely, but the parties 
could mutually change the agreementl08 or either party could termi­
nate the agreement by giving six months notice.lOO 
After the 1984 amendment of the ADEA gave the statute ex­
102. 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
103. Mahoney v. RFEJRL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1992). 
104. Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 447. 
105. See Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 2. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. at 3. "The contract ... contains exceptions to the mandatory retire­
ment provision for certain managerial positions and for employees who would qualify 
for pension benefits within three years." [d. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. at 5. 
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traterritorial effect,l1O RFEIRL believed its American employees 
would be able to work past the age of sixty-five.1ll RFEIRL ap­
plied to the company's "Works Council"ll2 for permission to make 
individual agreements with American workers to comply with the 
ADEA.113 The "Works Council" refused permission, after which 
the defendant appealed to a German Labor Court.n4 The German 
court, upholding the "Works Council" ruling, refused to permit the 
defendant to avoid the contested provision of the collective bar­
gaining agreement.11S 
Thereafter, the defendant continued to comply with the provi­
sions of the collective bargaining agreement, resulting in the termi­
nation of plaintiff Roy De Lon in 1987 and plaintiff William G. 
Mahoney in 1988.116 In January of 1989, the EEOC concluded that 
a violation of the ADEA had occurred and filed suit against RFEI 
RL.ll7 On May 4, 1990, after several months of discovery, the 
EEOC, believing that it would not prevail in the case, filed a Mo­
tion for Dismissal of Commission Suit Without Prejudice.us Both 
the EEOC and the trial judge were concerned about the continuing 
viability of a suit by individuals aggrieved by the defendant's al­
110. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1984 
amendment. 
111. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). For the 
factual history of the case, the court of appeals's report is often more complete and will 
be cited as necessary in this section. 
112. A "Works Council" is a required unit in Germany for firms with twenty or 
more employees. See id. "They are bodies elected by both unionized and nonunion­
ized employees. Their duties include [e]nsuring that management adheres to all provi­
sions of union contracts. Departures from contractual requirements are illegal without 
the Works Council's approval." Id. 
113. See Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 5. 
114. See id. 
115. See id. 
116. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 448. 
117. See EEOC v. RFEIRL, Inc., No. 89-0153 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 23, 1989). The 
EEOC had prior knowledge of RFEIRL's termination policies. In 1985, RFEIRL suc­
cessfully fought a suit challenging the mandatory age sixty-five retirement. In that case, 
the plaintiff filed suit prior to the 1984 amendment to the ADEA. The D.C. Circuit 
determined that the amendment to the ADEA did not apply retroactively, an opinion 
shared by the EEOC. See Ralis v. RFEIRL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
118. See EEOC v. RFEIRL, Inc., No. CIV.A.89-0153-LFO, 1990 WL 154321, at 
*1 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1990). The EEOC did not indicate in any way that it believed it 
had been mistaken in filing suit against RFEIRL. Later EEOC policy guidelines indi­
cate that the EEOC continued to believe a violation of the ADEA had occurred. See 
Seniority Systems, Extraterritoriality, and Coverage of Federal Reserve Banks, EEOC 
Enforcement Guidance, No. N-915.002, Oct. 20, 1993, available in WESTLAW, 1993 
DLR 203 d27, at 34-35 (stating that Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc. involved a situation in 
which the "foreign laws" defense to the ADEA "clearly [was not] available"). 
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leged discriminatory policies because the statute of limitations for 
filing a direct suit had expired.119 
On October 30, 1990, the trial judge, the EEOC, and RFEIRL 
reached an agreement that RFEIRL would waive the statute of lim­
itations, allowing the individuals 270 days to commence a suit, in 
exchange for the granting of the EEOC's voluntary dismissal mo­
tion.120 Thereafter, in 1991, plaintiffs Roy De Lon and William G. 
Mahoney filed suit in the United States District Court for the Dis­
trict of Columbia seeking damages for an unlawful discharge in vio­
lation of section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA.121 
B. 	 Opinion of the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia 
At trial, the defendant conceded that it had terminated the 
plaintiffs on the basis of age.122 However, the defendant claimed 
that section 623(f)(1) shielded it from liability because compliance 
with the ADEA would require it to violate German law.123 
The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the is­
sue of liability, requesting that the trial proceed immediately to a 
determination of damages.124 Similarly, the defendant moved for 
summary judgment on its affirmative defense.125 
To receive the protection of section 623(f)(1), the defendant 
attempted to establish that noncompliance with the mandatory re­
tirement provision in the collective bargaining agreement would re­
quire it to violate a "law" as defined in the statute. The defendant 
argued "that a mandatory retirement age is a deeply embedded 
concept in German labor practice" and that it is "'general policy of 
. the unions' to insist upon a mandatory retirement age."126 The de­
fendant then presented an expert who testified that collective bar­
gaining agreements have" 'legal' force" in Germany, because they 
are legally binding.127 The defendant sought to equate such collec­
tive bargaining agreements with "the laws" of Germany to receive 
the protection of section 623(f)(1). 
119. 	 See RFElRL, 1990 WL 154321, at *1. 
120. See EEOC v. RFEIRL, Inc., No. CN.A.89-0153-LFO, 1990 WL 179908, at 
*1 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 1990). 
121. 	 See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1992). 
122. 	 See ill. at 3. 
123. 	 See ill. 
124. 	 See ill. at 2. 
125. 	 See ill. 
126. 	 Id. at 3. 
127. 	 Id. 
476 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:455 
In rejecting the defendant's central argument, the district court 
listed two important and undisputed findings of fact regarding the 
retirement provision. "First, the provision is part of a contract be­
tween an employer and unions-both private entities-and has not 
in any way been mandated by the German government. Second, 
the provision does not have general application, as laws normally 
do, but binds only the parties to the contract."128 The court found 
particularly unpersuasive the argument that "practice" and "policy" 
were enough to bring the collective bargaining agreement within 
the scope of "law" in section 623(f)(1).129 
Since the district court found that RFEIRL's principal argu­
ment was flawed, the defendant attempted to avoid liability with 
alternative arguments. First, RFEIRL contended that it should be 
exempt from the provisions of section 623(f)(1) because the dis­
puted collective bargaining agreement was entered into prior to the 
effective date of section 623(f)(1).130 The court disagreed with the 
defendant on two separate grounds. Initially, the court noted, from 
a procedural standpoint, that such "argument misse[d] the mark," 
since the defendant had raised an affirmative defense to the ADEA 
which required the defendant to prove a conflict of laws.131 The 
court stated that the defendant's argument "does not go to the issue 
of whether the foreign labor union 'policy' or 'practice' is law."132 
Nevertheless, the court addressed the defendant's argument of the 
applicability of section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA to a prior contrac­
tual agreement. The court disagreed with the defendant's assertion 
that the discriminatory act in question occurred in 1982.133 Rather, 
the court found the time of the application of the provision, the 
128. Id. 
129. See id. at 34. In so holding, the court stated "[t]he ADEA is a remedial 
statute and exceptions to it are to be construed narrowly." Id. {quoting Sexton v. Bea­
trice Foods Co., 630 F.2d 478, 486 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing AH. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 
324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945»). The original quote in AB. Phillips, continued as follows: 
"To extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms 
and spirit is to abuse the interpretative process and to frustrate the announced will of 
the people." AH. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 493. The court of appeals surprisingly did not 
discuss the importance of this general rule of narrowly construing exceptions. As re­
cently as 1989, the Supreme Court, in Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989), 
quoted the AB. Phillips rule and stated "[i]n construing provisions ... in which a 
general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, we usually read the exception 
narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision." Id. at 739. 
130. See Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 4. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. See id. at 4-5. 
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actual termination, to be the significant time.l34 Since both plain­
tiffs were terminated after section 623(f)(1) went into effect, the 
court believed that the provision properly applied to the defendant. 
Next, the defendant cited the decision of the German Labor 
Court to which it unsuccessfully appealed the "Works Council" de­
cision, subsequent to the 1984 amendment to the ADEA, denying 
RFEIRL permission to employ Americans beyond age sixty-five.135 
The defendant emphasized the rulings of the Labor Court that 
workers under collective bargaining agreements with age sixty-five 
retirement provisions must retire at that age.136 The court dis­
missed this argument as non-responsive to the question of whether 
the collective bargaining provisions in Germany are "law" within 
section 623(f)(1).137 Rather, the court maintained that such rulings 
only evidenced the German Labor Court's enforcement of a private 
obligation between private parties.l38 As a general response to the 
defendant's argument, the court provided a pragmatic policy con­
sideration. "If overseas employers could avoid application of the 
ADEA simply by embedding an age-discriminatory provision in a 
contract, having a foreign court enforce the contract, and calling the 
court's decision 'law,' then the Act's extraterritorial provisions 
would be largely nullified, for employers could easily contract 
around the law."139 
Finally, the defendant made two other arguments that the 
court similarly dismissed. FIrst, the defendant claimed to have done 
all it could to comply with the ADEA, by applying to the Works 
Council and the German Labor Court for permission to deviate 
from the collective bargaining agreement, but failed in spite of its 
best efforts.l40 The court disagreed with the defendant on this 
point, claiming the defendant "could have done more to come into 
compliance."141 Second, the court dismissed an unsubstantiated 
claim that requiring the defendant to comply with the ADEA 
134. See id. 
135. See id. at 5. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. 
138. See id. 
139. [d. 
140. See id. 
141. [d. This argument was particularly insincere and unpersuasive to the district 
court in light of the available six-month termination provision. The defendant at­
tempted to argue that a unilateral termination would not have helped because the pro­
vision would continue to bind until a new agreement was reached. This argument, 
however, did not convince the court. See id. 
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would force the defendant to violate intemationallaw.142 Overall, 
the district court treated the defendant's supplemental arguments 
as non-responsive to the court's assertions that: (1) the mandatory 
retirement provision in the collective bargaining agreement was 
part of a contract between the parties to the lawsuit and nothing 
within German law required the defendant to agree to the provi­
sion; and (2) the mandatory retirement provision in the collective 
bargaining agreement binds only the parties to the agreement, not 
German workers in general.143 
The district court summed up the defendant's position as fol­
lows: "The defendant is essentially arguing that the German unions 
simply will not allow it to eliminate the mandatory retirement pol­
icy."144 After this condensed argument, the district court delivered 
a simplified response: "But the United States Congress will not al­
low it to retain the policy. Of the two, [Congress and the Works 
Council], only Congress makes law."145 
C. 	 Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit 
RFEIRL appealed the lower court ruling that compliance with 
its collective bargaining agreement did not result in the violation of 
a foreign "law" within the ADEA.146 On appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the 
district court's granting of the plaintiff's motion for summary judg­
ment. In reaching its decision, the court of appeals relied on the 
Supreme Court decision in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. 
American Train Dispatchers' Ass'n147 which the court found to be 
inconsistent with the interpretation of the district court.148 
The court of appeals began its analysis with a discussion of the 
relevant legal reasoning of Norfolk & Western. In Norfolk & West­
ern, the Supreme Court analyzed a collective bargaining agreement 
142. 	 See ill. at 6. 
143. 	 See ill. 
144. 	 Id. at 5-6. 
145. 	 Id. at 6. 
146. 	 See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
147. 499 U.S. 117 (1991). See supra notes 69-79 for a detailed discussion of the 
majority opinion in Norfolk & Western. 
148. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 449. The court of appeals expressed surprise, if not 
irritation, that neither party mentioned the case to the district court and neither party 
included the case in the appellate brief. However, the court of appeals expressed confi­
dence that the district court would have reached the same result had the parties brought 
Norfolk & Western to the lower court's attention. See ill. 
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in light of section 11341(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which 
contained an avoidance provision "from 'all other law."'149 The 
Supreme Court found that the meaning of the word "law" was 
clear, and included the law that gave force and effect to collective 
bargaining agreements.150 The court of appeals drew from the 
Supreme Court ruling the idea that contract law is the mechanism 
to enforce contractual obligations and that a contract cannot be de­
tached from this law.l5l 
In comparing the relevant statutory provisions, the court be­
lieved that the ICA's exemption provision and the ADEA's "for­
eign laws" exception were indistinguishable.152 The court of 
appeals analyzed RFEIRL's problem with the retirement provision 
in a manner consistent with Norfolk & Western. The court stated 
that if RFEIRL was required by the ADEA to continue employing 
American workers over the age of sixty-five, RFEIRL would be 
forced to violate German laws that enforced contractual agree­
ments and German Labor Court decisions.153 Compliance with the 
ADEA would therefore "cause" RFEIRL to violate foreign law.154 
Thus, section 623(f)(1) excused RFEIRL from compliance with the 
ADEr\. 
The court of appeals claimed that American Airlines, Inc. v. 
Wolens,155 a Supreme Court case decided after oral argument in 
Mahoney, did not undermine its reliance on Norfolk & Western.156 
In Wolens, decided almost four years after Norfolk & Western, the 
Court construed the preemption provision included in the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978 ("ADA").157 Under section 1305(a)(1), 
states were prohibited from enacting or enforcing "any law ... re­
lating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier."158 Unlike the 
Norfolk & Western holding that the ICA could suspend private con­
tractual agreements, the Supreme Court in Wolens held that private 
contractual agreements were not affected by the preemption provi­
149. [d. (quoting Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 127). 
150. See id. (citing Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 130, 133). 

15l. See id. 

152. See id. at 450. 
153. See id. 
154. See id. 
155. 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995). See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Wolens. 
156. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 450. 
157. See Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 82l. 
158. [d. (quoting § 1305(a)(1». 
480 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:455 
sion in the ADA.1s9 
In an attempt to reconcile the apparently inconsistent Supreme 
Court holdings, the court of appeals distinguished the facts of 
Wolens and Norfolk & Western.160 The court stressed the impor­
tance of contract enforcement relied on by the Wolens majority161 
and pointed out that if section 1305(a)(1) of the ADA preempted 
contract claims, none would be enforced because no agency was au­
thorized to hear them.162 
Furthermore, the court pointed to the Wolens majority view 
that the ADA incorporated by reference a statutory provision, 
which "preserved 'the remedies now existing at common law."'163 
In light of such "savings clause," it was necessary to read section 
1305(a)(1) as not preempting private contracts.164 Additionally, the 
court noted that the Wolens majority had itself distinguished the 
statute in Norfolk & Western on the grounds that without reading 
section 11341(a) of the ICA as preempting collective bargaining 
agreements, the statute as a whole did not make sense.16S 
Thereafter, the court of appeals asserted that "[u]nlike the situ­
ation in [Wolens] , construing the foreign laws exception in the 
[ADEA] consistently with Norfolk & Western would not render the 
Act senseless."166 To the contrary, the court of appeals argued that 
its view made sense, in light of the purpose of section 623(f)(1)'s 
foreign law exemption, which was "to avoid placing overseas em­
ployers in the impossible position of having to conform to two in­
consistent legal regimes."167 
Finally, in response to the plaintiffs' argument that the defend­
ants could have bargained harder to effect a change in the contract, 
as noted by the district court, the court of appeals stated that this 
fact was irrelevant because the "collective bargaining agreement 
here was valid and enforceable at the time of plaintiffs' termina­
tions, and RFEIRL had a legal duty to comply with it" and there 
159. See id. at 824. 
160. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 450. 
161. See id. (citing Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824) ("American's contracts must have 
legal force because the stability and efficiency of the market depended on the enforce­
ment of agreements."). 
162. See id. (citing Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824). 
163. Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988) (repealed 1994) (current version at 
49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1994))). 
164. See id. (citing Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 826). 
165. Id. (citing Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824 n.6). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
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could not be "any suggestion that RFEIRL agreed to the 
mandatory retirement provision in order to evade the [ADEA]."l68 
The court supported its contention by indicating that the provisions 
in the collective bargaining agreement requiring termination at age 
sixty-five were common throughout the German labor force.169 
Mahoney reached closure in the fall of 1995, when the 
Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certio­
rari,11o Nevertheless, the court of appeals did not deliver an un­
challengeable legal argument in finding for the defendant in 
Mahoney. The following section will look at the reasoning used by 
the Mahoney court with a critical eye, attempting to shed light on 
the strengths and weaknesses of the opinion. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In reaching an understanding of the pertinent issues in Maho­
ney, this section will separately consider three perspectives. The 
first part will involve a comparison of Norfolk & Western, Wolens, 
and Mahoney. Next, the role of the EEOC will be discussed, with a 
focus on ascertaining what weight the view of the EEOC should 
have been given by the court of appeals in Mahoney. Fmally, the 
legal analysis will conclude with a possible alternative explanation 
for the Mahoney result and a discussion of the strength of the court 
of appeals decision as future precedent. 
A. Norfolk & Western, Wolens, and Mahoney 
By using both Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. American 
Train Dispatchers' Ass'nl71 and American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens 172 
as support for its holding, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit created many more questions than 
it answered. Though both Norfolk & Western and Wolens involved 
private contractual obligations and statutory provisions that limited 
the coverage of the ICA and the ADA, respectively,173 the two 
168. [d. at 451. 
169. See id. 
170. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995). 
171. 499 U.S. 117 (1991). See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text for the 
full discussion of Norfolk & Western. 
172. 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995). See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text for the 
full discussion of Wo/ens. 
173. In Norfolk & Western, the relevant provision of the leA, § 11341(a), was an 
exemption provision, see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text; while in Wo/ens, the 
relevant provision of the ADA, § 1305(a)(1), was a preemption provision, see supra 
notes 85-86 and accompanying text. Both provisions result in the suspension of law. 
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cases reach completely opposite results. In Norfolk & Western, the 
Court found the exemption provision "from the antitrust laws and 
from all other law, including State and municipal law" to include a 
collective bargaining agreement between the parties.174 In Wolens, 
however, the Court found the preemption provision of "any law, 
rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and 
effect of law" did not include, and therefore could not preempt, 
private contracts between private parties.175 
In spite of the facial differences between Norfolk & Western 
and Wolens, the court of appeals in Mahoney claimed that both 
cases supported its holding. The court found the reasoning of Nor­
folk & Western controlling with respect to the interpretation of 
"law" within section 623(f)(1) of the ADEAp6 Additionally, the 
court found the discussion by the Wolens majority of the impor­
tance of contracts to support the result in Mahoney, which allowed 
the private contract between the parties to the lawsuit to be 
enforced.177 
Even though the Wolens reading of "law" left the private 
agreement undisturbed, which is effectively the same result that the 
Mahoney court reached with its interpretation of "law," the Maho­
ney court claimed that the Norfolk & Western holding, which 
achieved the opposite result of voiding a private agreement, was 
controlling. The court selectively picked from the two Supreme 
Court cases, using one to support its statutory construction and the 
other to support its result.178 The Mahoney court attempted to dis­
tinguish the facts and circumstances of Wolens from the comparable 
facts and circumstances found in both Norfolk & Western and Ma­
honey to establish that it correctly interpreted the statutory text.179 
The Mahoney court's conclusion that Norfolk & Western con­
trolled the statutory interpretation is suspect. The most obvious 
criticism of the court's assertion is that the 'statutory interpretation 
The preemption provision always exempts compliance with contradictory laws, in con­
trast to the exemption provision, which only allows exemption in certain situations. The 
differences in application is effectively negated, however, because the issue in both 
cases as it related to Mahoney was whether the term "law" was intended by Congress to 
include contracts at all. 
174. See Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 127, 133. 

175.' See Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824, 826. 

176. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
177. See id. at 450. 
178. See supra notes 149-67 and accompanying text for the Mahoney court's ap­
plication of Norfolk & Western and Wolens. 
179. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 450. 
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of Wolens could just as easily have been used by the court as prece­
dent on the meaning of "law." If the court had relied on Wolens, 
then "laws" within section 623(f)(1) would mean only those laws 
arising from the government, not those which seek to enforce pri­
vate agreements. The result under this approach would then resem­
ble the result in Norfolk & Western, where a statute excused 
noncompliance with a collective bargaining agreement. The statute 
in Mahoney would supersede the private agreement between the 
parties. Although this result would place RFEIRL in a difficult sit­
uation, the district court in Mahoney argued quite persuasively that 
this type of dilemma is not of such significance that a court should 
refuse to apply United States law,180 
A second concern arising from the court of appeals's interpre­
tation of section 623(f)(1) regards the court's reading of the statu­
tory text of the ADEA when compared to the approaches used by 
the Norfolk & Western and Wolens Courts. In Norfolk & Western, 
the Court read the phrase "from the antitrust laws and from all 
other law, including State and municipal law" to express on its face 
congressional intent to include private agreements.1S1 Neverthe­
less, the Court looked beyond the statute to the agency opinion for 
other indicia of support for its conclusion,182 In Wolens, the Court 
first looked to the text of the statute, and then considered the facts 
and circumstances, including the legislative history and the agency 
interpretation, before concluding that "any law, rule, regulation, 
standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law" did 
not include private contracts.l83 
It appears from Mahoney that the court of appeals initially 
looked to the text of the statute. Instead of trying to determine if 
the text clearly expressed congressional intent, however, the court 
looked beyond the facts of the case and the language and legislative 
history of the ADEA to a different case, Norfolk & Western, which 
dealt with a different statute, the ICA. The court apparently did 
not look to either the legislative history or the relevant agency in­
terpretation before looking to Norfolk & Western. Under both 
Norfolk & Western and Wolens, the court of appeals has deviated 
180. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1992). 
181. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American 1i'ain Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 
117,127, 133 (1991). 
182. See supra Part I.C.1. 
183. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 824-26 (1995). See 
supra note 90 for a further discussion of how the Court reached its conclusion. 
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from established Supreme Court approaches to resolving the tex­
tual uncertainty. 
The shortcomings of the court of appeals's approach in Maho­
ney mayor may not have resulted in harm to the losing plaintiffs. If 
the court reached a correct result in spite of its deficiencies, then 
little or no harm has resulted. If, however, the court of appeals 
wrongly interpreted section 623(f)(1), and thereby wrongly con­
cluded that the defendant was exempt from the ADEA, then mani­
fest harm has resulted. It is necessary to look for answers to this 
question in other relevant sources, because the three important 
cases, Norfolk & Western, Woiens, and Mahoney, fail to resolve the 
problem. 
B. The Missing EEOC 
A major problem in Mahoney was the court's failure to address 
the views of the EEOC.184 From the available agency materials,185 
it appears certain that the EEOC would have agreed with the dis­
trict court in Mahoney, which denied RFEIRL the section 623(f)(1) 
defense.186 The examples, included in the Policy Guidance on sec­
tion 623(f)(1) of December 1989, aid greatly in understanding the 
EEOC's belief as to the state of the law. Example 2 involved a 
provision in a company charter, which was registered with the for­
eign host state as required by law, that violated the ADEA.187 
Compliance with the charter, even though the charter was regis­
tered with the state, would be a violation of the ADEA because the 
EEOC did not consider the charter to equate to "law" in the stat­
ute. The Mahoney facts could be viewed as similar to this example, 
184. According to the Supreme Court, deference to administrative agencies is 
based on "the practical expertise which an agency normally develops" and "to accord 
some measure of flexibility to ... an agency as ... new and unforeseen problems [arise] 
over time." International Bhd. of Thamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979). 
As discussed supra Part I.B.3, whether EEOC guidelines should be afforded the same 
deference as agency regulations is an open question. 
185. These materials were discussed in Part I.B of this Note. See supra notes 33­
41 and accompanying text for a discussion of these materials; see also supra notes 117­
20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the early procedural history of Mahoney. 
Specifically, the materials include: two Policy Guidances on the ADEA, supra notes 33, 
187, which include three examples of violations of the ADEA in a foreign setting, supra 
notes 39-41 and accompanying text; the early stage of the Mahoney litigation materials, 
in which the EEOC was a party to the lawsuit, supra notes 117-20; and a later Enforce­
ment Guidance that stated the EEOC believed Mahoney to involve a clear violation of 
the ADEA, supra note 118. 
186. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1992). 
187. See Policy Guidance, supra note 35, at 5121-22. See supra note 39 and ac­
companying text for Example 2. 
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if one views the charter and the collective bargaining agreement as 
two privately created obligations that could lead to legal problems 
if violated. 
The fourth example could be viewed as even more determina­
tive of the EEOC's view in a case like Mahoney. The example in­
volved a foreign fee imposed on employers who employ workers 
beyond age sixty-five.l88 The EEOC would not permit the em­
ployer to assert a section 623(f)(1) defense based on the fee, be­
cause the employer could pay the fee, continue to employ the 
worker, and violate neither foreign law nor the ADEA. The exam­
ple mandates a direct causation requirement. 
In Mahoney, the collective bargaining agreement between 
RFEIRL and the plaintiffs provided for a unilateral right of termi­
nation with six months notice.l89 After the expiration of six 
months, RFEIRL would be free to strike a new bargaining agree­
ment with its workers that allowed American employees to con­
tinue working past age sixty-five.l90 The new agreement might 
require RFEIRL to grant concessions to the workers which had a 
monetary value. Whether or not a cost was involved, at the very 
least the process would be inconvenient. However, the direct cau­
sation requirement established in Example 4 does not support cost 
or difficulty as an acceptable reason within section 623(f)(1). 
Rather, compliance with the law itself must cause the violation of 
the ADEA. Therefore, using the reasoning of Example 4, RFEI 
RL's violation of the ADEA was arguably caused not by German 
law, but rather by RFEIRL's failure to terminate the collective bar­
gaining agreement. Since "foreign law" did not cause RFEIRL's 
violation, section 623(f)(1) would not apply. Both examples sup­
port the view that the EEOC would have favored the district court 
ruling. 
Even more supportive of this conclusion was an EEOC gui­
dance entitled Seniority Systems, Extraterritoriality, and Coverage of 
188. See Policy Guidance, supra note 35, at 5123. See supra note 41 and accom­
panying text for Example 4. 
189. See supra note 141, indicating that the district court in Mahoney raised the 
issue of the termination provision. 
190. This argument assumes that RFEIRL would not be forced to terminate an 
American employee until after the six month notice period expired. This contingency 
would have been satisfied with respect to both plaintiffs William Mahoney and Roy De 
Lon in Mahoney, since the ADEA was amended in 1984 and the plaintiffs were not 
terminated until 1988 and 1987, respectively. See Mahoney v. RFFJRL, Inc., 47 F.3d 
447, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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Federal Reserve Banks .191 The EEOC release, which came after the 
district court decision in Mahoney, stated that the EEOC found 
Mahoney to be a clear violation of the ADEA.192 The release im­
plied that when the EEOC released the second set of ADEA guide­
lines in 1989, it believed that the Mahoney facts involved a violation 
of the ADEA.193 
Since a published EEOC interpretation regarding section 
623(f)(1) existed at the time of litigation, the court of appeals 
should have at least acknowledged the opinion's existence, if not 
considered it in resolving the case. This approach was seemingly 
required by both Norfolk & Western and Wolens, as the Supreme 
Court acknowledged in both cases that the Court. and the relevant 
agency shared a common statutory interpretation.194 Nevertheless, 
the court cited to both Supreme Court cases without following the 
approach used in both decisions.195 
Assuming that the EEOC did in fact consider RFEIRL's ac­
tions as violative of the ADEA and not exempted by section 
623(f)(1), then a relevant agency opinion existed at the time of trial. 
1\vo issues must be addressed: (1) what standard of deference the 
EEOC opinion should have received in Mahoney, and (2) how the 
outcome in Mahoney would have been affected if the EEOC opin­
ion was considered. 
The Supreme Court cases of Skidmore v. Swift & CO.196 and 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 197 
provide the two potential deference standards for EEOC guide­
lines.198 Which standard is correct hinges on the open question of 
191. See Seniority Systems, Extrate"itoriality, and Coverage of Federal Reserve 
Banks, EEOC Enforcement Guidance, No. N-915.002, Oct. 20, 1993, available in 
WESTLAW, 1993 DLR 203 d27, at 34-35. 
192. See id. . 
193. Although the EEOC did withdraw from the Mahoney litigation, no indica­
tion exists to show that the EEOC in any way believed that it wrongly alleged a viola­
tion of the ADEA. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
194. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American 1i'ain Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 
117, 133-34 (1991); American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. a. 817, 824 n.6, 826 
(1995). 
195. See supra Part III.A for an evaluation of the Mahoney court's application of 
Norfolk & Western and Wolens. 
196. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
197. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
198. In both Skidmore and Chevron, deference to an agency is relevant only 
when a statute is ambiguous. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of Skidmore and the Skidmore test. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Chevron and the Chevron test. The following analysis, which will 
attempt to relate the EEOC interpretation of § 623(f)(1) to both Skidmore and Chev­
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whether EEOC v. Arabian American Oil CO.,l99 which stated that 
Skidmore controlled, supplanted the earlier decision EEOC v. 
Commercial Office Products Co. ,200 which applied Chevron. Be­
cause the proper standard of deference for EEOC guidelines is an 
open question, it is appropriate to test the EEOC opinion under 
both Skidmore and Chevron.201 
The EEOC promulgated its first guidelines on the meaning of 
section 623(f)(1) in 1989. Under the Skidmore four factor test,202 
the EEOC guidelines would likely fare well and deserve significant 
deference. FIrst, the EEOC was very thorough in creating the Pol­
icy Guidance on section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA, as it created five 
explicit and detailed examples for use in understanding the mean­
ing of the statute. Second, the EEOC appears to interpret section 
623(f)(1) logically, as a narrow exception to the general rule that 
ron, assumes that § 623(f)(1) is ambiguous and does not facially express congressional 
intent. This assumption is supported by the court of appeals in Mahoney, which looked 
to the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 11341(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act for 
aid in construing § 623(f)(1). See supra notes 149-69 for the analysi~ used by the court 
of appeals. 
199. 499 U.S. 244 (1991). See supra notes 13-17 for a discussion of Arabian 
American. 
200. 486 U.S. 107 (1988). 
201. Although Arabian American is a more recent decision, the Commercial Of­
fice Prods. high deference standard appears to be better supported. First, Commercial 
Office Prods. applied its standard of deference for EEOC guidelines, the reasonable­
ness approach, to resolve the case. See Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. at 115. In 
Arabian American, however, the Court did not use the Skidmore standard of deference 
to decide the case. See supra text accompanying note 64, indicating that the Supreme 
Court decided the relevant issue in Arabian American, whether TItle vn applied over­
seas, on the failure of Congress to clearly express an affirmative intent to extend cover­
age overseas. See supra- notes 13-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
clear-statement rule. Rather, the Court stated in dicta that the appropriate standard 
was Skidmore. See Arabian Am., 499 U.S. at 257. As precedent, only Commercial Of­
fice Prods. is controlling. Additionally, Justice Scalia persuasively argued in his Ara­
bian American concurrence that the Skidmore approach, created forty years before 
Chevron, was outdated and Chevron embodied the modem trend. See id. at 259-60 
(Scalia, J., concurring).· For a more detailed discussion of Justice Scalia's concurring 
opinion in Arabian American, see supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. Neverthe­
less, an argument exists that since Chevron concerned only agency regulations, it has no 
value as precedent with respect to agency guidelines. Therefore, Skidmore is the only 
controlling precedent for agency guidelines. Since the Supreme Court has yet to offi­
cially address this question, neither argument can effectively be accepted or rejected. 
See generally Yavelberg, supra note 43, for a thorough discussion of this question. 
202. The Skidmore four factor test, which courts use to determine the weight of 
deference to give to agency guidelines, includes: (1) "the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration," (2) "the validity of its reasoning," (3) "its consistency with earlier and 
later pronouncements," and (4) "all those factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking power to controL" Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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the ADEA covers Americans working for American companies in 
foreign countries. Third, the EEOC pronouncement is not inconsis­
tent with any previous agency interpretations, since the 1989 release 
was the first to discuss the exception in section 623(f)(1). There are 
no subsequent pronouncements on the statute that would cause a 
contradiction. Finally, although the fourth prong is somewhat am­
biguous, the EEOC's primary responsibility in the administration 
and enforcement of the ADEA favors giving weight to the EEOC 
guidelines. 
Although the Skidmore factors support giving strong weight to 
the EEOC opinion of section 623(f)(1), nothing requires a court to 
ultimately defer to the agency. In contrast, the Chevron test, which 
prohibits courts from simply ignoring an agency opinion, should 
lead to a certain result with the EEOC guidelines. Under Chevron, 
the only question to answer with an ambiguous statute and a corre­
sponding agency interpretation is whether the agency interpretation 
is reasonable.203 With respect to section 623(f)(1), the EEOC's de­
termination that a collective bargaining agreement does not fall 
within the definition of "law" appears reasonable, as stated above, 
because it would make little sense for Congress to grant extraterri­
torial effect to the ADEA if Congress planned to allow parties to 
contract around the law. Additionally, the reasoning used in 
Wolens supports the conclusion that the EEOC's opinion is reason­
able.204 Therefore, if the Chevron test was applied correctly, a 
court would be obligated to defer to the EEOC's interpretation of 
section 623(f)(1). 
The court of appeals's exclusion of the EEOC's interpretation 
of the "foreign laws" exception to the ADEA appears to have ad­
versely affected the outcome in Mahoney. Under both Skidmore 
and Chevron, the EEOC opinion of section 623(f)(1) should have 
received some deference. Since the EEOC opinion appeared to 
match the interpretation of the district court and conflict with the 
interpretation of the court of appeals, the court of appeals was ar­
guably wrong in finding for the defendant. In the final part, this 
section of the Note will discuss an alternative legal means of resolv­
ing the dispute in Mahoney. This final section will find common 
203. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984). 
204. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. a. 817,824,826 (1995) (hold­
ing that the word "law" did not include private contractual agreements in the Airline 
Deregulation Act). 
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ground between the district court and the court of appeals in an 
attempt to unravel the inconsistencies in Mahoney. 
C. 	 An Alternative Legal Approach 
The evaluation of Mahoney thus far has focused on the con­
cern that the court of appeals resolved the controversy in an inap­
propriate manner.20S However, an inquiry into fairness will 
demonstrate that, as between the plaintiffs and RFEIRL, the result 
was correct. For future parties, however, the decision may be disas­
trous. Under the assumption that neither the district court nor the 
court of appeals resolved the controversy in a satisfactory manner, 
this Note, considering retroactivity concerns, will propose a new 
method of resolving the controversy that is both legally sound and 
achieves fairness to the parties in Mahoney and future parties en­
countering a similar concern.206 
1. 	 A Reevaluation of the Controversy Considering Fairness 
to the Litigants 
In Mahoney, the district court and court of appeals opinions 
each achieved positive and negative results.207 Using the district 
court approach, an employer violates the ADEA when it complies 
with terms of a collective bargaining agreement that conflict with 
the statute.208 It does not matter if the collective bargaining agree­
ment was created before or after the effective date of the conflicting 
statutory provision. In both instances, employers are subject to lia­
bility for violating the ADEA. From a simple fairness approach, it 
is less fair to subject an employer to liability when the employer 
205. See supra Part UlA-B. 
206. The discussion to follow introduces fairness concerns prior to evaluating the 
question of retroactivity. Avoiding "the unfairness of imposing new burdens on persons 
after the fact" is the basis for the presumption against applying statutes retroactively; 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,270 (1994); thereby making fairness a rele­
vant consideration. A complete discussion of retroactivity is beyond the scope of this 
Note. For a detailed discussion of Landgraf and the present state of the law concerning 
retroactivity, see Michael D. Blanchard, Note, Statutory Construction of Section 541(a) 
of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of1992: A Presump­
tion in Favor of Practical Reason, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 437 (1996). 
207. For this paragraph, see generally the discussion of the district court opinion 
in Mahoney, supra Part U.B. 
208. In this discussion, the employers should be considered American employers 
that employ American workers in a foreign country. The collective bargaining agree­
ments should be considered foreign agreements between American employers and 
American employees in the foreign country in which the employee works, and the 
agreements are enforceable in that country. 
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complied with a bargaining agreement created prior to the enact­
ment of the law which caused the conflict. This hypothetical paral­
lels the facts of Mahoney, where the collective "bargaining 
agreement between RFEIRL and the plaintiffs was created in 1982, 
but the ADEA did not make it unlawful to retire American work­
ers in foreign countries at age sixty-five until 1984.209 In contrast, 
no concern over fairness exists when the cQllective bargaining 
agreement was created subsequent to the change in the statute that 
made the bargaining agreement unlawful. In this instance, an em,;. 
ployer has entered into an unlawful agreement. If the employer 
enforces the unlawful agreement, if is subject to liability. 
The court of appeals reversed the district court and applied an 
opposite approach.210 Using the court of appeals's approach, all 
collective bargaining agreements equate to "foreign laws" as de­
fined by section 623(f)(1). Therefore, any employer that complies 
with a collective bargaining agreement in violation of the ADEA 
will be excused from that statutory violation under the "foreign 
laws" exception. Again, it does not matter if the collective bargain­
ing agreement was created before or after the effective date of the 
conflicting statutory provision.211 In either instance the employer is 
not subject to liability for violating the ADEA. From a simple fair­
ness approach, it is less fair to exempt an employer from liability 
when the employer negotiated the inclusion of a bargaining agree­
ment term in conflict with the ADEA after the statute made the 
provision unlawful. In this instance, an employer has in effect en­
tered into an unlawful agreement, but avoids liability on a techni­
cality. In contrast, the concern over fairness lessens when the 
employer entered into the collective bargaining agreement prior to 
the effective date of the law making a provision in the agreement 
unlawful. This hypothetical also parallels the facts of Mahoney. 
In both the district court and court of appeals approaches, 
some form of unfairness results. With the district court, employers 
209. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1984 
amendments to the ADEA. 
210. For this paragraph, see generally discussion of the court of appeals opinion in 
Mahoney, supra Part IT.C. 
211. This discussion assumes that the court of appeals's approach applies to both " 
pre- and post-amendment agreements because the court's reading of § 623(f)(1), equat­
ing a collective bargaining agreement with law, allows for no distinction. See supra Part 
II.C for the discussion of the court of appeals's resolution of the controversy. The court 
of appeals, however, did imply that an equitable exception was possible when defend­
ants attempted to contract around the ADEA. See infra note 212 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the possible equitable exception. 
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are subject to liability based on lawfully created collective bargain­
ing agreements. With the court of appeals, employers are released 
from liability on unlawfully created collective bargaining agree­
ments. Without directly addressing the problem with pre-amend­
ment agreements, the court of appeals implied that an exception to 
section 623(f)(1) might be available in situations where employers 
attempted to contract around the ADEA.212 
Tension exists between the court of appeals's acknowledge­
ment that equitable concerns are important and its holding that col­
lective bargaining agreements equate to "laws" in section 623(f)(1). 
Particularly troubling is the idea that a court must inquire into the 
facts surrounding the enactment of a collective bargaining agree­
ment containing a term that conflicts with the ADEA to determine 
if it is "inequitable" to apply the law.213 If the court of appeals truly 
212. The court of appeals did note that RFEIRL could not have attempted to 
evade the ADEA by contracting around the statute because the collective bargaining 
agreement in Mahoney pre-dated the change in the ADEA. See Mahoney v. RFE/RL, 
Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1995). This statement by the court of appeals evidences 
two significant beliefs. FIrst, the court of appeals was concerned with subjecting RFEI 
RL to liability for complying with a lawfully negotiated agreement. Second, the court 
of appeals believed that a contrary result was available if evidence existed that an em­
ployer intentionally contracted around the ADEA to avoid compliance with impunity. 
213. The need for an alternative approach is evidenced by a recent law review 
article that stated, without any qualification, that '''[l]aws of the [foreign] country' has 
been construed to include collective bargaining agreements." See Phillip I. Blumberg, 
The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidi­
ary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 295, 342 n.174 (1996). The possibility of 
an equitable exception implied in Mahoney will not ensure certain and consistent appli­
cation of the ADEA abroad. The court of appeals in Mahoney simply noted that the 
enactment of the discriminatory clause prior to the 1984 amendments foreclosed any 
possibility "that RFEIRL agreed to the mandatory retirement provision in order to 
evade the [ADEA]." Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 451. The language neither provides a court 
with guidance on how to determine if an employer was attempting to evade the ADEA 
nor does it provide guidance on what action the court should take if the court deter­
mines that the employer attempted to evade the ADEA. Additionally, the unqualified 
statement in the above article that the "foreign laws" exception includes collective bar­
gaining agreements suggests that courts may simply ignore or overlook the conduct of 
employers before applying the exclusionary provision of § 623(f)(1). These concerns 
are further exacerbated by the fact that TItle VII contains an exclusion provision 
modeled after § 623(f)(1). See supra note 19. Analogous legal reasoning could result in 
employers avoiding liability for discrimination based on sex, race, national origin, or 
religion provided the collective bargaining agreements mandated such discrimination. 
Cf. See Seniority Systems, Extraterritoriality, and Coverage of Federal Reserve Banks, 
EEOC Enforcement Guidance, No. N-915.002, Oct. 20, 1993, available in WESTLAW, 
1993 DLR 203 d27, at 34-35 (The EEOC release noted that "[a]lthough [the district 
court opinion in Mahoney was] decided under the ADEA ..., the reasoning of Maho­
ney is equally applicable to analysis of the foreign laws defense under TItle VII ...." 
By negative inference, the court of appeals's approach in Mahoney can also be applied 
to the TItle VII exception provision). 
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believes this approach is correct, it has created a strange process for 
the evaluation of the adjudicability of age discrimination claims like 
that found in Mahoney. It is possible that the court of appeals in 
Mahoney was truly concerned with punishing the defendant for ex­
ercising its lawfully negotiated contract right of mandatory retire­
ment, yet found no alternative legal theory to address this concern. 
2. The Defendant's Argument at Trial 
The evaluation of the equities of the district court and court of 
appeals opinions in Mahoney evidences (l) unfairness to employees 
when no liability results from post-amendment agreements and (2) 
unfairness to employers when liability results from pre-amendment 
agreements. To avoid the unfairness in both scenarios, the ADEA 
must apply to foreign collective bargaining agreements, but only to 
ones created after the statute became extraterritorial. This solution 
concerns redefining the effective date of the amended statute. 
In recognizing that a different effective date for the amend­
ment could resolve the dispute in Mahoney, an interesting question 
arises-whether the debate over the meaning of the statute should 
have instead been a debate over coverage of contractual obligations 
that existed at the time of amendment. Essentially, this question 
addresses the issue of retroactivity. The inquiry into this question is 
two-fold: (1) does the application of section 623(f)(1) to pre-1984 
collective bargaining agreements create a retroactive effect and, if 
so, (2) does section 623(f)(1) apply retroactively.214 The focus of a 
debate over retroactive effect would be on the time of RFEIRL's 
discriminatory act. If the discriminatory act occurred prior to 1984, 
at the time of the creation of the collective bargaining agreement, 
then the 1984 amendments to the ADEA would have to apply ret­
roactively in order to make RFEIRL's collective bargaining agree­
ment unlawful. By contrast, if the discriminatory act occurred upon 
the termination of the plaintiffs, which was after the ADEA be­
came effective overseas, then no retroactivity concerns would exist. 
At trial, the defendant raised the issue of retroactivity, arguing 
that it lawfully discharged the plaintiffs because the collective bar­
gaining agreement preceded the 1984 amendment to the ADEA.21S 
The district court, while acknowledging that an argument existed 
214. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505 (1994). In reality, the 
second question is not in dispute. In a previous case involving the same defendant, 
RFEIRL, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the 1984 amendments did not 
apply retroactively. See Ralis v. RFEIRL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
215. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1992). 
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that the time of discrimination was the time of contracting, found 
the 	argument unpersuasive.216 The judge found Lorance v. AT&T 
Technologies, Inc. ,217 to support the defendant's argument, but also 
to foreclose the application of the argument in Mahoney.218 
Lorance involved the determination of the time of discrimina­
tion for statute of limitations purposes with the adoption of a 
facially neutral seniority system.219 The district court found that, 
although Lorance held that the relevant time of discrimination in 
the 	case of a facially neutral seniority system was the time of its 
creation, the Supreme Court nevertheless acknowledged "that a 
facially discriminatory system ... can be challenged at any time, 
because such a system 'by definition discriminates each time it is 
applied."'220 Applying this rationale to Mahoney, the district court 
found the relevant time of discrimination to be the time of dis­
charge.221 A more detailed explanation of the district court's con­
clusion with regard to the relevant timing is necessary in order to 
understand the true nature of the defendant's concern. 
3. 	 The Domestic Setting: The Tune of Amendment 

Determines Retroactivity Analysis 

To evaluate the district court's determination that the time of 
termination was the relevant measuring time for a statutory viola­
tion, it is necessary to consider the underlying legal reasons sup­
porting the conclusion. The issue in Mahoney, in the broadest 
sense, concerned the legality of terminating employees solely based 
on their age. With the 1984 amendment to the ADEA, Americans 
working abroad for United States companies obtained new protec­
tion that previously existed only domestically.222 This amendment 
created a "public right" in all of society, not just workers affected 
by the change. According to the Supreme Court, a "public right," 
in contrast to a "private right," is "a statutory right ... closely inter­
twined with a federal regulatory program Congress has the power 
to enact" or a right that "belongs to [or] exists against the Federal 
Government."223 
216. See id. at 4-5. 
217. 490 U.S. 900 (1989). 
218. See Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 4-5. 
219. See Lorance, 490 U.S. 900. 
220. Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 5 (quoting Lorance, 490 U.S. at 912 n.5). 
221. See id. 
222. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1984 
amendments to the ADEA. 
223. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989). 
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Employment discrimination statutes by their very nature con­
cern "public rights."224 Such statutes, created by Congress, estab­
lish rights in all of society, or an identifiable portion of society. 
Prior to the enactment of these statutes, no such right exists in the 
public. 
Concerning the time of discrimination with a "public right," 
Supreme Court precedent establishes that "public rights" warrant 
different treatment than "private rights." The Court, in cases con­
cerning the "public rights" associated with federal wage and hour 
laws under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),225 "ha[s] held 
that congressionally granted FLSA rights take precedence over 
conflicting provisions in a collectively bargained compensation ar­
rangement."226 In elaborating on the purpose of the FLSA, the 
Court found that: 
Congress intended . . . to achieve a uniform national policy of 
guaranteeing compensation for all work or employment engaged 
in by employees covered by the Act. Any. . . contract falling 
short of that basic policy, like an agreement to pay less than the 
minimum wage requirements, cannot be utilized to deprive em­
ployees of their statutory rights.227 
The Court's discussion establishes that "public rights" create new 
rights by elevating one's protections rather than by destroying pre­
existing obligations. 
Congress created "public rights" with the FLSA and "public 
rights" with the ADEA and Title VII in an analogous fashion. With 
the employment discrimination statutes, Congress elevated societal 
224. See, e.g., Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737-38 
(1981) (Supreme Court stating that "in enacting Title VII, Congress had granted indi­
vidual employees a nonwaivable, public law right to equal employment opportunities 
..." (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974»); Fisher v. 
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 547 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that Title vn 
protects "important public rights"); Home v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 
489 F. Supp. 465, 469-70 (D. Mass. 1980) (court equated the importance of the Title vn 
public rights recognized in Gardner-Denver with the ADEA protections); EEOC v. 
American Nat'l Bank, 420 F. Supp. 181, 185 (E.D. Va. 1976) (noting that "[t]he EEOC 
indeed has a duty to vindicate the important public rights secured to all citizens under 
Title VII") (citation omitted). 
225. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). The Supreme Court has long found the FLSA 
to involve "public rights." See Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739-41 and cases cited therein. 
226. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740-41 (citing Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning 
Co., 327 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1946); Walling v. Hamischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427, 430-32 
(1945); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 
166-67, 170 (1945». 
227. Id. at 741 (quoting Tennessee Coal, Iron & RR Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 
123, 321 U.S. 590, 602-03 (1944». 
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protections to the level of "public rights." As a result, contractual 
agreements inconsistent with these later statutes must necessarily 
yield just as contractual wage agreements below the FLSA's mini­
mum wage yielded with that earlier statute's passage. Regarding 
the enactment of the 1984 amendments to the ADEA, non-exempt 
contracts and collective bargaining agreements228 that included pro­
visions violating the ADEA could no longer be enforced, including 
the mandatory age sixty-five termination clause included in the col­
lective bargaining agreement between RFEIRL and the Mahoney 
plaintiffs.229 
Relating the "public rights" aspect of the 1984 amendment to 
the district court's conclusion that the disputed collective bargain­
ing agreement discriminates at the time of termination, it is appar­
ent that the district court reached the correct conclusion under 
existing law and precedent, which presently covers only the domes­
tic setting. Once Congress changed the ADEA, no agreements 
equivalent to that in Mahoney could lawfully be enforced beyond 
the effective date of the statute. 
4. 	 The Foreign Setting: A Proposal That the TIme of 
Contracting Controls Retroactivity Analysis 
Returning to the earlier fairness discussion,230 the correctness 
of the district court's decision by no means obviates the resulting 
unfairness to the defendant under that court's approach. A future 
litigant may well be placed in the same predicament that RFEIRL 
encountered as a result of the district court's decision-terminate 
people like the plaintiffs and be subject to liability under the 
ADEA231 or continue to employ people like the plaintiffs and vio­
late German labor law by unilaterally changing a term of the collec­
tive bargaining agreement.232 A new approach is therefore 
necessary in situations like Mahoney where parties in foreign coun­
tries are legally obligated to follow two contradictory policies. 
The basis for the proposed approach is based on the distinction 
between the domestic setting and the foreign setting. If Mahoney 
228. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exception 
from foreign coverage included in § 623(f)(1) of the ADEA. 
229. Essentially. RFEJRL's contractual right to follow its collective bargaining 
agreement tennination clause gave way to the public's right to see employees like the 
Mahoney plaintiffs continue in their jobs. See supra Part II.A for the facts of Mahoney. 
230. See supra Part III.C.l. 
231. See generally district court opinion in Mahoney, supra Part II.B. 
232. See supra note 109 (indicating that a unilateral change violates Gennan law). 
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was a domestic case, the employer could not have lawfully termi­
nated a sixty-five year old employee covered by an agreement like 
that in Mahoney. On the other hand, no labor union could seek to 
force that employer to comply with the invalid termination provi­
sion. Essentially, an employer would lose the right to enforce the 
collective bargaining agreement, but would be insulated from liabil­
ity for failing to do so. In Mahoney, however, under the district 
court's approach, American law forbade RFEIRL from enforcing 
the termination clause while German labor law compelled it to en­
force the agreement. The result left RFEIRL in a "Catch-22," with 
inevitable liability. 
The proposed approach is to treat the agreement between 
RFEIRL and the Mahoney plaintiffs as a "private right" between 
the parties no different than any other individual contract right. 
This approach assumes that the employer (1) remains bound by a 
private agreement in a foreign country233 and (2) cannot avoid com­
pliance with American employment discrimination law. When con­
sidering the power of Congress in creating "public rights," treating 
a binding foreign agreement as private is legally sound. In the do­
mestic setting, Congress can effectively invalidate previously ex­
isting obligations by creating new statutes. In the Mahoney setting, 
Congress lacks the power to elevate American law over a foreign 
contractual agreement. This distinction warrants the separate 
treatment. 
Applying this approach, the time of contracting would be con­
sidered the relevant time rather than the time of termination. Be­
cause the District of Columbia Circuit previously determined that 
the 1984 amendment was not to be applied retroactively,234 the dis­
trict court in Mahoney would have granted summary judgment in 
favor of RFEIRL. This approach removes the problems of unfair­
ness from the application of section 623(f)(1) noted above.235 No 
employers would be subject to liability on collective bargaining 
agreements created prior to 1984 and no employers would escape 
liability on collective bargaining agreements created after 1984. In 
the first instance, the rights of an employer would be protected. In 
the second instance, the rights of an employee would be protected. 
With the proposed alternative approach presented in this Note, 
233. If the employer is not bound by a foreign agreement, that employer has no 
basis to avoid complying with American law under § 623(f)(1) and is specifically ex­
cluded from this proposed approach. 
234. See supra note 214. 
235. See supra Part III.C.1. 
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no foreign collective bargaining agreement negotiated before the 
1984 amendments to the ADEA would be covered by the statute. 
This approach obviates the need to stretch the definition of "laws of 
the [foreign] country" within section 623(f)(1) to include collective 
bargaining agreements, a reading of the statute criticized by this 
Note. Indeed, under the alternative approach, every foreign agree­
ment containing an age-based discriminatory provision in conflict 
with the ADEA would have been negotiated after the 1984 amend­
ment to the ADEA prohibited employers from committing such 
discrimination. The court of appeals's reading of the statute, on the 
other hand, would authorize, and possibly encourage, employers to 
contract around the ADEA. This reading of the "foreign laws" ex­
ception could not reflect the intent behind section 623(f)(1), as both 
the district court and the court of appeals expressed concern over 
employers attempting to contract around American law. Thus, the 
only plausible construction of the statute as applied to post-amend­
ment agreements would be the district court's, where American 
statutory laws remain supreme over contractual provisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc. presents two related questions. 
FIrst, the question of what constitutes a "foreign law," allowing an 
employer to avoid compliance with the ADEA, was pivotal to the 
outcome of the case. The district court and court of appeals 
reached opposite conclusions on the viability of the defendant's for­
eign law defense. Congress provided the courts no help in reaching 
a conclusion, as legislative history is lacking for the ADEA and 
other related employment discrimination statutes that apply extra­
territorially. The only possible direct guidance on the question was 
a published EEOC interpretation of the statute which, ironically, 
neither court chose to mention. 
This ironic point leads to the second issue raised by Mahoney. 
The question of what level of judicial deference EEOC interpreta­
tions merit is one that continues to be unresolved. A debate over 
the proper standard of deference to afford the EEOC-a debate 
between the Skidmore and Chevron tests--could have provided 
strong arguments to aid in the resolution of Mahoney, but neither 
the lower court opinion nor the appellate court opinion indicates 
that the agency interpretation was considered in the outcome of the 
case. Yet, by omission, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit made the agency opinion relevant. By simply ig­
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noring the EEOC and reaching a conclusion in conflict with the 
agency position, the court appeared to commit error because both 
available tests supported some degree of deference. 
In looking to an alternative approach, this Note attempts to 
resolve seemingly unanswered questions from Mahoney. The need 
for a different method of resolving the case is apparent when fair­
ness concerns are highlighted. Essentially, the court of appeals 
reached a fair result on the facts of Mahoney at the potentially high 
cost of interfering with congressional intent to apply American law 
in foreign settings. By contrast, the district court properly inter­
preted the narrow reach of the foreign laws exception, but reached 
an unfair result on the facts of Mahoney. To avoid both unfairness 
and the thwarting of Congress's will, this Note proposes a retroac­
tivity-based approach which would effectuate a proper balance of 
law and equity. 
Andrew P. Walsh 
